Abstract-A cooperative relay network operating in the presence of eavesdroppers, whose locations are distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process, is considered. The relay is equipped with a very large antenna array and can exploit maximal ratio combing in the uplink and maximal ratio transmission in the downlink. A realistic model in which the channel state information of every eavesdropper is not known is considered, as eavesdroppers tend to hide themselves in practice. The destination is thus in a much weaker position than all the eavesdroppers because it only receives the retransmitted signal from the relay. Under this setting, the security performance is investigated for two relaying protocols: amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward. The secrecy outage probability, the connection outage probability, and the tradeoff between them, which is controlled by the source power allocation, are examined. Finally, suitable solutions for the source power (such that once the transmission occurs with high reliability, the secure risk is below a given threshold) are proposed for a tradeoff between security and reliability.
product of two random vectors can converge in distribution. Indeed, massive MIMO systems have been demonstrated to improve secure performance in several studies [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Having said that, the role of massive MIMO systems in preventing eavesdroppers is not yet completely understood, mainly because PLS contains relatively many distinct aspects such as artificial noise (AN) techniques, antenna/ relay/jammer/user selection techniques, and strategies to deal with the leakage of information. Moreover, different combinations of secure and relaying techniques also make security scenarios more diverse. Thus, the issue of security in massive MIMO relaying systems is still largely open.
Additionally, it is should be mentioned that the assumptions made about of eavesdroppers are of crucial importance. Notably, since the locations of eavesdroppers is typically not known, many authors have taken into account the spatial distribution of eavesdroppers by adopting a spatial point process model. For example, in order to model the spatial location of eavesdroppers, Wang and Wang [13] , Wang et al. [14] , and Chae et al. [15] used a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) model because of its mathematical tractability. It should also be noted that in the context of stochastic geometry, the PPP is the most widely used and important point process to describe spatially distributed discrete nodes [16] [17] [18] . Thus, the PPP will be adopted to model the spatial location of eavesdroppers in this paper.
Among recent works on security for massive MIMO relaying systems [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , Chen et al. [3] , [4] considered cooperative relay systems and compared the security improvement for both amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relaying, while only the AF scheme (or the DF scheme) was considered in [5] and [6] (or in [7] and [8] ). These works, however, did not consider any direct link between source and eavesdropper. Note that in general, eavesdroppers may possibly receive two versions of transmitted messages from the source and relay in cooperative relay networks. Thus, the lack of consideration of direct links in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] could lead to an incomplete understanding of the ways in which eavesdroppers can benefit from the configuration of cooperative relay networks. On the other hand, the impact of a direct eavesdropping link on the secure performance of relay networks was presented in [19] , but there was no discussion of large antenna arrays. Finally, other recent papers on secure massive MIMO networks (not necessarily relay-aided networks) can be also found in the literature (e.g. [9] [10] [11] [12] ) in the context of the impact of the so-called pilot contamination scheme in which an eaves-0090-6778 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
dropper can send a pilot sequence to attack massive MIMO systems, but this issue is beyond the scope of our paper. 1 Note that none of the above studies (i.e. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ) have considered the spatial locations of eavesdroppers as a whole and the impact of direct eavesdropping links in particular. On the contrary, the works in [13] [14] [15] considered the same assumption of the eavesdroppers' spatial distribution as in this work, but the topic of large antenna arrays was not discussed. For example, [13] analyzed the secure performance for millimeter wave systems instead of massive MIMO systems. While Wang et al. [14] and Chae et al. [15] used artificial noise instead of large antenna arrays to deal with eavesdropping attacks. Given that the artificial noise technique is also a signal generation process, the additional complexity it adds may not be necessary for large-scale antenna systems, because such systems themselves can provide considerable benefits in terms of security [4] . Aiming to investigate the joint impact of massive MIMO systems and eavesdroppers' geometric locations on the secure performance, [20] analyzed the secrecy outage probability (SOP) with emphasis on the potential locations of eavesdroppers. However, eavesdroppers in [20] are assumed to be uniformly distributed with a fixed number of eavesdroppers. Such an assumption may be unreasonable for wireless systems which typically do not have the knowledge of the number of eavesdroppers. It is clear that the assumption of PPP-distributed eavesdroppers has not yet been adopted for secure massive MIMO systems as a whole, and secure massive MIMO relaying systems in particular.
In short, the works on security (mentioned in the above paragraphs) have analyzed either massive MIMO systems without using a PPP model for eavesdropper locations, or conventional MIMO systems with the use of such a PPP model. Thus, our work fills this gap by adopting the more realistic assumption of PPP-distributed eavesdroppers for cooperative wireless systems with large antenna arrays. In this paper, we consider a secure wireless network with the aid of a large antenna array at an intermediate relay. As for the relaying protocol, we consider conventional relaying schemes like AF and DF for comparison purposes, instead of delving into more recently-developed relaying schemes (e.g. [21] ). Around the relay, there exist many potential eavesdroppers whose locations are assumed to follow a PPP; thus, we must take the direct links between source and eavesdroppers into account. On the hand, the direct link between source and destination is assumed to be impaired and neglected. Intuitively, all potential eavesdroppers can take advantage of the fact that they receive two versions of confidential signals. To quantify how harmful the eavesdroppers can be, we evaluate the secure performance by using the SOP. Then we use an ON-OFF scheme for the transmission in which the source transmits its messages only when the legitimate channels are strong enough (i.e. reliable enough). To elucidate how reliable the secure transmission can be, we evaluate the performance by using the connection outage probability (COP). Finally, based on the SOP and the COP, we examine the state in which 1 The context of pilot contamination can be ignored when considering a single cell, and especially when the pilot training only accounts for a very small portion of each coherence interval. our system is the most secure, and show that this state can be achieved when the source power is just slightly larger than a certain threshold (as long as the COP reaches 0). We also derive asymptotic expressions for the SOP and the COP for each relaying strategy. We observe that if the ratio of the average transmit power at the source to the average noise power at the destination is high, the security of the proposed system seems to depend on only the eavesdroppers' working range as well as the intensity of their presence. We also observe that when the source power increases, the SOP reaches its largest limit, while the COP equals 0. Moreover, for both relaying protocols, the reliability of the system is demonstrated to gain from increasing the number of antennas. Finally, our numerical results show the agreement between analysis and simulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the network configuration and restricts the case study to the worst case. In Section III, we provide the approximate characterization of the received signalto-noise ratios (SNRs) assuming a large antenna array. Sections IV and V derive exact and asymptotic expressions for the SOP and the COP, respectively. In Section VI, optimization problems are suggested for the AF and DF cases in order to improve the secure performance. Numerical results are shown in Section VII and finally, conclusions are provided in Section VIII.
Notation:
and [·]
† denote the transpose operator, conjugate operator, and Hermitian operator, respectively. Vectors and matrices are represented with lowercase boldface and uppercase boldface, respectively. I n is the n × n identity matrix. · denotes the Euclidean norm. E {·} denotes expectation. z ∼ CN n ( ) denotes a complex Gaussian vector z ∈ C n×1 with zero-mean and covariance matrix ∈ C n×n . Exp (r ) denotes the exponential distribution with rate r .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a cooperative relay network in which there is a single source (S), a trusted relay (R), a destination (D), and multiple passive eavesdroppers (Ei with i = 1, 2, . . .). 2 The distance between S and D is very large so that R is invoked to help convey messages from S to D.
As such, it is reasonable to assume that there is no direct link between S and D. However, the direct link between S and Ei is taken into account since Ei is likely to be present around S and/or R to overhear some confidential messages. We assume that R is equipped with a very large receive antenna array to decode its received signal in the uplink and a very large transmit antenna array to forward its decoded signal in the downlink; meanwhile, each of the remaining nodes (i.e. S, D and Ei ) has only one antenna. It should be noted that both the number of transmit antennas and the number of receive antennas at R are equal to N 2. The eavesdroppers are assumed to be spatially distributed according to a homogeneous PPP with intensity λ > 0, and yet they are only present within a circle B(R R 0 ), which is centered at the origin R with the radius R R 0 . 3 By keeping silent to avoid being detected, eavesdroppers do not get involved in actions like attacking pilot sequences.
Regarding the propagation model, we consider both smallscale and large-scale fading factors. The small-scale fading is characterized by h XY ∈ C n×1 or h T XY ∈ C n×1 with its magnitude being Rayleigh distributed. We assume that the column vector h XY or h T XY is distributed according to CN n (I n ). The large-scale fading is characterized by l −α/2 XY with α > 2 being the path-loss exponent and l XY R 0 being the length of the X−Y link. In path loss models [22] [23] [24] , l XY is understood as the ratio of the real distance to R 0 . For example, R 0 is often taken to be 100 m for microcells [24] , in which case l XY = 2 means that the real distance between X and Y is 2R 0 = 200 m.
To facilitate the analysis, we use polar coordinates with R being the origin (as aforementioned) and φ being the
Obviously, l SE is a function of l and φ due to the random spatial distribution of Ei .
Regarding transmission, we use two equal time slots. In the first time slot, S transmits the source signal s ∈ C to R. In the second time slot, S keeps silent while R forwards the relaying signal r ∈ C N×1 to D. In these two phases, both the signal transmitted from S (i.e. s) and the signal retransmitted from R (i.e. r) are overheard by Ei .
• We normalize s such that E |s| 2 = 1, and then the signals received at R and Ei in the first time slot are, respectively, written as
where n R ∼ CN N (I N ) and n E,1 ∼ CN 1 (1) are additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at R and Ei , respectively; and L −α/2 SR h SR ∈ C N×1 and l −α/2 SE h SE ∈ C are the complex channel coefficients for the S-R and S-Ei links. 3 It is important to note that if λ is measured by the average number of eavesdroppers over the area of R 2 0 , then the average number of eavesdroppers within the circle B(R R 0 ) is calculated as λ R 0 2π 0 ldldφ but not λ R R 0 0 2π 0 ldldφ. Herein, R 0 is referred to as a reference distance, while R is the ratio of the real radius to R 0 . For example, if we have R 0 = 1 km and R = 2, the radius of the considered circle will be 2 km. γ S is the average received SNR per antenna at R as well as the average received SNR at Ei . Note that the average noise power is assumed to be the same at every receive antenna.
• We normalize r such that E rr † = I N , and then the signals received at D and Ei in the second time slot are, respectively, written as
where n D ∼ CN 1 (1) and n E,2 ∼ CN 1 (1) are AWGNs at D and Ei , respectively; and L −α/2 RD h RD ∈ C 1×N and l −α/2 h RE ∈ C 1×N are the complex channel coefficients the R-D and R-Ei links. γ R is the average received SNR at D as well as at Ei . We note that for the sake of simplicity, the average noise power is assumed to be the same at every receive antenna. This leads to the fact that both (1) and (2) contain the same γ S , while both (3) and (4) contain the same γ R . With the noise normalization, γ S is both the average received SNR per antenna at R and the average received SNR at Ei , while γ R is the average received SNR at D as well as Ei . It should also be noted that the subscript [·] E is implicitly related to Ei with i ∈ ; however, the index i is dropped for notational convenience.
A. MRC/MRT at the Relay
After being received at R, the signal y R is then multiplied by a weighting vector w † ∈ C 1×N to combine the N received signals in (1) using maximal-ratio combing (MRC). Moreover, in the uplink, w is designed only based on h SR because the instantaneous h SE is not known (i.e. there is no channel state information (CSI) for the eavesdroppers). 4 Hence, according to the MRC principle, we have w = h SR / h SR . The obtained signal after this process can be written as
The MRC output signal r 0 is then processed by R according to the chosen relaying protocol (i.e., AF or DF). Then, the obtained signal r 0 is multiplied by another weighting vector v ∈ C N×1 to form the retransmitted signal r. In the same way as the design of w, the weighting vector v is designed only based on h RD . As such, applying maximal-ratio transmission (MRT) to the downlink, we have v = h * RD / h RD . Hence, the relation between the decoded signal r 0 and the retransmitted signal r is given by
In the following, the expressions for r 0 will be discussed for the two different relaying operations, namely, AF and DF.
1) AF at R:
In this case, the signal r 0 is simply a scaled version of the signal r 0 , i.e.
where c AF is a constant subject to the following transmit power constraint:
Using (5)- (8) yields
Substituting (5) and (9) into (6)- (7), we obtain a new expression for r and then again substituting this new expression into (3)- (4), we can rewrite (3)- (4) as
where
2) DF at R: In this case, we consider the case in which both the source and the relay use the same codeword for their transmission [25] . The signal r 0 is successfully decoded from the signal r 0 , and thus we have the following relation:
where c D F is a constant subject to the constraint (8) . From (6), (8) and (14), we have c D F = √ N whereby (6) can be written as
Substituting the above expression into (3)- (4), we can rewrite (3)- (4) as
B. Signal-to-Noise Ratios in the Worst Case
We assume that each Ei is capable of exploiting the best possible decoding strategy to maximize its received signals. Herein, we suppose that Ei is able to use MRC to combine one signal from S and N signals from R. Obviously, the strategy for the eavesdroppers will differ depending on whether the relay is using AF or DF. (2) and (11), the overall received signals at Ei can be written as
1) AF at R: From
Then using MRC receiver with the weighting vector f AF , we can write the combined output at Ei as
From (19), the instantaneous SNR at Ei can be generally written as [26] 5
where R AF is the covariance matrix of n AF . The equality in (20) holds for
with τ being an arbitrary constant. It is apparent that in practice, a wise Ei is likely to design f AF = f AF opt to maximize its received SNR. Taking this into account, we assume that the received SNR at Ei is
As such, we will only discuss this practical scenario throughout the rest of this paper. The covariance matrix of n AF in (18) can be expressed as
Substituting g AF in (18) and R AF in (23) into (22), we can write the instantaneous SNR at Ei in the case of AF as
From (10), the instantaneous SNR at D can be written as
5 Since the term R AF in (20) is positive definite, we can factorize it into U † U by using Cholesky decomposition. The left hand side of (20) can be rewritten as
g AF ∈ C 2×1 . Obviously, the new expression for the instantaneous SNR at Ei with respect to f 0 is now a Rayleigh quotient [27] - [28] ; therefore we have max
where λ max is the maximum eigenvalue of g 0 g † 0 , and the last equality follows from the fact that g 0 g † 0 has rank one. Then the right hand side of (20) is obtained by substituting
2) DF at R: Expressions for the SNRs for the DF scheme are formulated differently from those for the AF scheme. When only considering the indirect transmission from S to D through R, we can infer the instantaneous SNR at Ei from (1) and (17) as follows [29] :
Similarly, when only considering the direct S-Ei link, we can infer the instantaneous SNR at Ei from (2), i.e.
Finally, with the assumption that Ei uses MRC to combine signals from direct and indirect links, the instantaneous SNR at Ei is given by [26] SNR
From (1) and (16), the instantaneous SNR at D can be written as [29] 
Observation: From (24)- (25) we can see that both SNR AF E and SNR AF D are increasing functions of γ S . Thus, there will be a need to determine a suitable value of γ S in making the trade-off between these SNRs. In contrast, the same does not hold for SNR
D F E and SNR

D F
D . In both relaying operations, γ R will not enter into our trade-off problem. With the large number of antennas configured at R, it is reasonable to keep the average total relay power (i.e. γ R ) constant such that the consumed power-per-antenna at R is reduced.
III. SNR APPROXIMATION FOR LARGE ANTENNA ARRAYS
In this section, we will evaluate the secure performance of the proposed system under the assumption that the number of transmit and receive antennas at R is very large. Recall the following well-known properties 6 :
• Property (P1): Let p ∈ C N×1 and q ∈ C N×1 be complex-valued column vectors whose elements are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with zero means and variances of σ 2 p and σ 2 q .
• Property (P2): With p and q as in (P1), we have 6 These properties are derived from the Lindeberg-Levy theorem and law of large numbers (see [2] , [30] , [31] and references therein).
To proceed, we first rewrite (24)- (25) as
and (28)- (29) as 
. Note that we have 
To facilitate a general analysis that can be applied to both schemes, we use the following notation: 
dx. (43)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: The CDF of snr D F E is given by
F snr DF E (μ) = 1 − e − μm γ R l −α + γ S l −α SE γ R l −α − γ S l −α SE e − μ γ S l −α SE × ⎡ ⎣ 1 − e μ m 1 γ S l −α SE − 1 γ R l −α ⎤ ⎦ + e − γ S L −α SR N γ R l −α 1 − e − (μ−μm ) γ S l −α SE 1(μ > γ S L −α
SR N).
(44) Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY (SOP)
In this section, we evaluate the secure performance of the proposed system through the SOP. We first suppose that Ei succeeds in partially decoding the received signal if its instantaneous SNR is larger than or equal to a certain threshold μ. When eavesdroppers are non-colluding, we can define an outage event as the event in which "there is at least one Ei that can partially decode its received signal." Based on this definition, the SOP is referred to as the probability of the occurrence of the outage event, i.e.
in which max Ei∈ SNR E ≥ μ implies that among existing eavesdroppers, the eavesdropper with the maximum received SNR can decode signals. 8 
A. Analysis With Large N
Under the assumption of (very) large N, we can use (45), (38) and (39) to arrive at the following approximation:
where the equality (a) follows from the application of the probability generating function (PGF) [16] . Herein, P{snr E < μ } = F snr E (μ) is the probability that a given Ei cannot decode the received signal. In the following, we evaluate the SOP for the two relaying protocols of interest. Denote SOP μ ≡ SOP AF μ and SOP μ ≡ SOP D F μ for the two different relaying cases.
1) AF Scheme:
The SOP in the AF case is given by 8 For the colluding eavesdroppers scenario, the outage event should be defined as the event of the occurrence Ei∈ SNR E ≥ μ. This interesting scenario might not be mathematically tractable and is a topic for future consideration.
By substituting (40) into (47), we have
which can also be explicitly written as in (49) at the bottom of the previous page.
2) DF Scheme:
The SOP in the DF case is given by
by repeating the same steps as in the derivation of (47). Substituting (44) into the above equation, we arrive at an exact expression for (50) as shown in (55) at the top of this page.
B. Analysis With Large N and High γ S
With very large N, we proceed to consider the performance at high γ S (i.e. γ S → ∞). With finite μ and large enough N, we have μ m = min{μ, γ S L −α SR N} = μ. Herein, we do not consider the case of high γ R because the instantaneous increase in N and γ R is obviously costly and impractical. Once N is large, γ R had better be low to reduce the power consumption per antenna at R.
1) AF Scheme:
We consider the following terms:
and
Taking the limit of (40) at γ S → ∞, we have
Then using the two above-calculated limits, we obtain the limit of P AF E in (48) at γ S → ∞ as follows:
2) DF Scheme: Taking the limit of (44) at γ S → ∞, we have
Then, the limit of (50) is given by 
V. CONNECTION OUTAGE PROBABILITY (COP)
To restrict information leakage to a certain extent, we consider an on-off transmission strategy (see, e.g., [32] ). As for this strategy, a threshold η is compared to the instantaneous SNR at D before the transmission is performed. More precisely, if SNR D ≤ η, then S keeps silent (OFF-state); otherwise, S will transmit confidential signals (ON-state). As such, the transmission will be in the OFF-state with probability P SNR D ≤ η which is termed the COP, i.e.
(59)
A. Analysis With Large N
Under the assumption of (very) large N, we can use (59), (34) and (36) to arrive at the following approximation:
In the following, we analyze the COP for the AF and DF protocols.
1) AF Scheme:
We replace snr D with snr AF D in the above expression to obtain the COP for the AF case, i.e.
There is no surprise that the COP takes only two values, either 1 or 0, due to the fact that all parameters γ S , γ R , N, α, L SR , L RD , and η are predetermined. From the design perspective, we want COP η = 0 because it implies that the confidential transmission can occur (in the ON-state). As such, considering the on-off transmission strategy, we must make sure that the two following conditions hold true:
2) DF Scheme: With snr D F D substituted for snr D in (60), the COP for the DF case can be calculated as
Similarly to the AF case, we wish to have COP η = 0, and so
needs to be satisfied.
B. Analysis With Large N and High γ S
As analyzed in the last subsection, we need to set the values of γ S , γ R and N such that the COP is equal to 0 for each relaying strategy at R. With high γ S (i.e. γ S → ∞) the second condition in (64) is almost surely true, because lim γ S →∞ P γ S > ϒ η = 1; thus, the COP in the AF case will approach 0 (i.e. the OFF-state does not occur) at high γ S given that the first condition in (64) is satisfied. Meanwhile, the second condition in (67) does not seem to be achievable at high γ S ; thus, the COP can reach 0 as long as the first condition in (67) is satisfied. In short, the OFF-state occurs at high γ S when η < γ R for the AF scheme and
−α for the DF scheme.
VI. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF
In this section, we evaluate the interactions of the key secure metrics including the SOP, the COP and the end-toend (e2e) secrecy rate (SR). In this analysis, the SOP and the COP will be jointly evaluated in another probabilistic metric, i.e. the probability of achieving the most secure transmission state. On letting A denote the most secure transmission state and A denote the replacement for A in the case of (very) large N, we have P{ A} ≈ P {A}. Similarly, with large N, the e2e SR (in nats/s/Hz) can be expressed as C s = , 0 where the factor of 1/2 is due to the fact that the transmission is divided into two equal time slots. All metrics C s , SOP μ and COP η involve the same parameter γ S ; thus, we respectively rewrite C s , SOP μ and COP η as C s (γ S ), SOP μ (γ S ) and COP η (γ S ) to emphasize the role of γ S in our analysis. Possible insecure/secure states of the proposed system versus corresponding ranges of (snr D , snr Emax ). Now, let us look at Fig. 2 which is provided for illustration. In the figure, there are two regions for the e2e SR: the region y0z corresponds to C s (γ S ) = 0 (i.e. snr D ≤ snr Emax ), while the region x0z corresponds to C s (γ S ) > 0 (i.e. snr D > snr Emax ). Further in Fig. 2 , we consider two scenarios for η as follows:
• With η > μ, the transmission only occurs in the ON-state (COP η (γ S ) = 0) if a pair of (snr D , snr Emax ) lies in the region u A 1 x. In this case, there are three subcases corresponding to three regions:
• With η ≤ μ, the transmission only occurs (in the ON-state) if the considered pair of instantaneous SNRs lies in the region u A 4 x. In this case, there are four subcases:
x in the case of η ≤ μ, the proposed system will attain the most secure state with C s (γ S ) > 0, COP μ (γ S ) = 0 and snr Emax < μ. We focus only on the case of η > μ in this paper and evaluate the probability of the event A = {(snr D , snr Emax ) ∈ v A 2 A 1 x}. The probability of the occurrence of the event A is given by
We will denote P {A} as P {A} AF and P {A} D F for the AF case and DF case, respectively.
A. AF Case
In order to maximize the probability P {A} AF , we aim to solve the following optimization problem:
Using (64), the constraints are γ R > η and γ S > ϒ η . Once the constraint γ R > η is satisfied, (P AF ) has the optimal solution
for all γ S > ϒ η (according to Proposition 3). In contrast, if the constraint γ R > η is not satisfied, the event A does not occur regardless of any value of γ S . As such, we have
B. DF Case
Analogously to the AF case, we suggest the optimization problem for the DF case as follows:
Using (67), the constraint becomes
Moreover, SOP μ (γ S ) increases with γ S , and so the problem (P D F ) has two optimal solutions:
Finally, the maximal value of P {A} D F can be readily deduced from (71) as follows:
Remark 2: Both cases require cooperation between S and R such that γ S and γ R meet the requirement for quality of service 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides several numerical examples to verify the correctness of our analysis and show secure characteristics of the proposed system. Relating to distance parameters, the distance reference R 0 is traditionally selected from 100 m to 1 km for large cellular systems [22] [23] [24] . With the selection of R 0 within [100m, 1000m], the measurement unit of λ will be implicitly understood as the average number of eavesdroppers over R 0 × R 0 m 2 . Note that the selected value of R 0 does not change our numerical results, which depend on the distance ratios L SR , L RD and R . Furthermore, a suitable value of the path loss exponent α should be from 2 to 3. Thus, we choose to set α = 2.5 for all numerical examples. Finally, we note that all simulation results have been performed for SOP μ , COP η and P{ A}; whereas, all analytical results have been performed for SOP μ , COP η and P {A}.
In Figs In Fig. 3 , two subcases of L SR are considered, i.e. L SR = {1, 4}. We can see that the security performance in the AF case is better than in the DF case for each considered value of L SR . However, when γ S exceeds 15 dB for the case of L SR = 1, the security performance of both schemes is the same and thereby, the role of the relaying protocol becomes indistinguishable. Interestingly, the decrease in L SR (i.e. S comes closer to R) does not ensure that the secure performance will be improved.
Regarding Figs. 4-5, we fix the distance ratio L SR and change the radius ratio R . We observe that the secure performance inversely decreases with the increase in R . This observation is consistent with the phenomenon that as the working range increases, the eavesdroppers will become more dangerous. In Fig. 6 , we depict the SOPs versus λ. Again, the results confirm that the AF scheme gives better secure performance. Moreover, the difference in performance between the two schemes decreases with increasing γ S . Furthermore, an increasing density of eavesdroppers also causes a worse situation for the proposed system (as can be observed intuitively).
In Fig. 7 of N = 40, the first constraint γ R > η is satisfied, i.e. γ R = 10 dB > 8.38 dB, and so the COP theoretically reaches 0 at any γ R > ϒ η ≈ 16.6 dB. Likewise, in the case of N = 70, the constraint γ R ≈ 13.01 dB > 5.95 dB, and so the COP is expected to be 0 at any γ R > ϒ η ≈ 11.26 dB. In comparison between the two cases, we can see that an increase in N helps to enhance the reliability. For example, if the secure transmission occurs at γ S = 15 dB, then N = 70 will be selected because the theoretical COP equals 0; in contrast, N = 40 will lead to an unsecured transmission as the theoretical SOP is 1.
In Fig. 8 , we depict the COPs versus γ S in the DF case. Similar to the AF case, the gap between the analysis and simulation becomes smaller when N increases. Moreover, if one of the two conditions in (67) is satisfied, the COP reaches 0. For example, in the case of N = 40, the condition η ≈ 10 8.38/10 < γ R = 10 10/10 dB < γ S (2/1.5) −2.5 can be attained if γ S > 13.12 dB. In the case N = 70, the condition ω η ≈ 10 9.07/10 < γ S ≤ 10 10/10 (1.5/2) −2.5 ⇔ 9.07 dB < γ S ≤ 13.12 dB will lead to COP D F η = 0. In Fig. 9 , the probability of the most secure state P {A} AF is shown with respect to γ S . The results show that excellent agreement between the analytical curves and the simulation curves is attained as N increases. We can see that with N = 50, we have P {A} AF > 0 at any γ S > 21 dB. In contrast, to have P {A} AF > 0 in the case of N = 70, we have to set γ S > 19 dB. As such, an increase in N helps ensure P {A} AF > 0 when γ S decreases. As analyzed in Section VI, P {A} AF reaches its maximum when γ S → ϒ + η . For example, with N = 70 we have max γ S P {A} AF = P {A} AF γ S =ϒ η + ≈ 0.811 where is a very small positive number. Likewise, in Fig. 10 , the probability of the most secure state P {A} D F is also illustrated vs. γ S . The behavior of P {A} D F is similar to that of P {A} AF .
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a relay-aided wireless system in which the relay is equipped with a large antenna array in the presence of many potential eavesdroppers, whose positions follow a homogeneous PPP. Furthermore, compared to the destination, the eavesdroppers have the advantage of direct links between them and the source. Under these assumptions, we have employed an ON-OFF strategy and evaluated the security as well as the reliability of the system through probabilistic metrics. Analytical and simulation results show that an increase in the gain γ S reduces the secure performance in both AF and DF case. Such an increase in γ S , however, helps enhance the reliability in both AF and DF cases. Finally, optimization problems have been proposed for each relaying scheme such that the probability of achieving the most secure state in each transmission is maximized. Among other conclusions, we have seen that a large value of the array size N makes the COP reach 0, which means that secure transmission can occur for sufficiently large arrays. SR N+1 +γ R l −α . The CDF and probability density function (PDF) of X can be, respectively, written as
and 
After some manipulations, (78) can be expressed in the form of (44).
C. Proof of Proposition 3
First, we note that both snr E and SOP μ are functions of γ S . To emphasize this, we rewrite snr E and SOP μ as snr E (γ S ) and SOP μ (γ S ), respectively. It is straightforward to show snr E ( p 2 ) − snr E ( p 1 ) ≥ 0 for p 2 > p 1 , and thus snr E (γ S ) is an increasing function of γ S . For p 2 > p 1 , we have
which demonstrates that SOP μ (γ S ) increases with γ S . Moreover, lim γ S →∞ SOP μ = 1−exp{−πλR 2 } as calculated in (54) and (57) for each considered case; thus this limit value is also an upper bound on SOP μ at high γ S .
